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Introduction
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge, truth, and the justification of belief.
Epistemology of religion considers these issues in relation to religious truth claims (e.g., whether
or not it is reasonable to believe that God exists). Often, the epistemology of religion leads to
inquiry into fundamental attitudes towards the criteria for justification. For example, a major
strain of contemporary epistemology of religion has been characterized “as a debate over
whether evidentialism applies to the belief component of faith, or whether we should instead
adopt a more permissive epistemology.”1 Thus, whether or not evidentialism is the appropriate
approach to epistemology comes into question. This question functions as the primary
motivation for this paper.
I will ultimately show some of the limitations of evidentialism and outline, why, on the
basis of these limitations, it cannot be taken as a universal criteria for measuring the justification
religious belief. That is, I will show that the evidentialist project fails insofar as it was an attempt
to provide a universal criterion for justification that could be legitimately applied to any given
religious belief in any circumstance. I will argue that evidentialism is limited like this because
religious beliefs and their justification should not, indeed cannot, be legitimately separated from
the worldview and presuppositions in which they are embedded. Rather, a more informed
approach to epistemology of religion should take into account the important relationship that
exists between worldviews and the justification of religious beliefs. Evidentialism fails because it
does not provide a sufficiently flexible and nuanced criterion that can be legitimately applied
across multiple worldviews. A corollary to this point is that it is appears to be impossible to find
any such universal, trans-worldview criteria for measuring the justification of belief.
1

Peter Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013).
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Procedure
We will first consider the general lay of the land, as it were, in contemporary epistemology of
religion. In the first place, this will involve an outline of the position known as Enlightenment
evidentialism with its characteristic claim that because there is insufficient evidence that it is
therefore unreasonable to believe in God. Next we will consider several responses to this thesis
including the positions commonly referred to as Natural Theology, Wittgensteinian Fideism, and
Reformed Epistemology. After this treatment of contemporary epistemology of religion I will
then work out an alternative response to Enlightenment evidentialism. This response is loosely
grounded in the Presuppositional school of Christian apologetics.2 In addition to formulating this
response it will be helpful to compare and contrast it with the first three responses because there
are a number overlapping concerns. The Presuppositional response to Enlightenment
evidentialism is thus sympathetic to all three positions without out being ultimately reducible to
any of them. Before closing we will consider several potential objections and problems with this
view. In the end, this sort of response to Enlightenment evidentialism should provide many
insights into the nature of epistemology of religion, epistemology proper, and even of philosophy
in general.

2

Apologetics is the theological discipline concerned, roughly, with defending the reasonableness of one’s faith or
religious belief system. Presuppositionalism is one of several apologetic methods used by Christian apologists. The
central thesis behind this method is that it is philosophically necessary and, more importantly, theologically
necessary, to presuppose the truth of the Christian faith when defending its reasonableness. Presuppositionalists
typically want to argue in a “broadly circular” manner that is consistent with this pre-established conclusion. While I
do not have the space in this paper to fully present and defend Presuppositionalism, this paper can be understood as
laying down at least some of the philosophical groundwork that this apologetic method is built upon. That is, this
paper will illustrate at least one reason why, philosophically speaking, Presuppositionalists reject Enlightenment
evidentialism. In the course of this paper I will address some of the problems with such a view. For instance, that
because such a view employs a form of circular reasoning that it should be rejected and also that such a view
ultimately fideistic.
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Contemporary Epistemology of Religion
Enlightenment Evidentialism
As its name suggests, Enlightenment Evidentialism can be traced to several 18th century
Enlightenment thinkers. These thinkers include “…such notables as David Hume, Voltaire,
Rousseau, and the towering Immanuel Kant.”3 A common theme in their work was to
“…demand that all beliefs be subjected to the searching criticism of reason; if a belief cannot
survive the scrutiny of reason, it is irrational.”4 Their concern for properly grounded and wellformed beliefs was captured by Kant’s famous command, “Dare to know! (Sapere aude.) Have
the courage to use your own understanding.”5 While many of the enlightenment thinkers were
themselves theists, Enlightenment evidentialism represents a slightly later application of these
basic concerns to religious belief with the resulting conclusion that religious belief, and
especially belief in God, is unreasonable.
One of the most famous and frequently cited expressions of this sort of Enlightenment
evidentialism is W.K. Clifford’s 1877 essay “The Ethics of Belief”.6 This essay has had a lasting
impact and it succinctly captures the core sentiment of evidentialism.7 In this essay, Clifford
opens by telling a story about a hypothetical ship owner. The ship owner had very good reason

3

Kelly James Clark, Return To Reason (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 3. For some specific examples of their
work, see Hume’s essay On Miracles, section X of his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and also
Book IV of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
4

Kelly James Clark, “Religious Epistemology”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eds. James Fieser and
Bradley Dowden (2004).
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Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment?, trans. Mary C. Smith.
<http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html>
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William .K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” Contemporary Review 29 (1877): 289-309.
<http://www.uta.edu/philosophy/faculty/burgess-jackson/Clifford.pdf>. Clifford is not an Enlightenment thinker,
per se, as he was writing in the late 19th century. However, his work is representative of his predecessors’
sentiments.
7

Clark, Return To Reason, 98.
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(i.e., very strong evidence) to believe that his ship needed some significant repairs. Rather than
paying for these repairs he decided to suppress this knowledge. He decided to believe, contrary
to the evidence, that the ship would survive the voyage. Clifford then gives two different endings
to the story: 1) the ship sank and many lives were lost and 2) it made the voyage safely and no
lives were lost. In both cases, regardless of the outcome, there was still something deeply wrong
about what the ship owner has done. While the outcome was far worse on the first ending, both
stories involve the ship owner believing a certain proposition whether or not “…he had a right to
believe on such evidence as was before him.”8 Given that the ship owner was aware of what the
evidence clearly suggested about the condition of his boat, it was wrong for him to believe
anything to the contrary. The ship owner did not have the right to believe such a thing. In fact, he
was obligated to believe the converse, namely, that the ship was not sound and the he should
repair it soon.
After this he introduces another story involving a group of people being slandered upon
insufficient evidence.9 In this example it turns out that even a cursory glance at the readily
available evidence would have proved that the allegations were not true. However the slanderers
did not search for any evidence at all. They instead believed somewhat fanatically and upon
insufficient grounds. He then adds further details that complicate the story. As it turns out, while
the surface level evidence they ignored revealed innocence, a rigorous investigation would have
revealed that the accused parties were in fact guilty after all. Thus the slanders ended up with an
accidentally true belief formed by faulty and insufficient means. This works to illustrate the same
point as the example of the ship owner: “…the question is not whether their belief was true or

8

Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”, 290.
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Ibid., 290-291.
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false, but whether they entertained it on wrong grounds.”10 Thus, Clifford is primarily interested
in this essay with the reasons that we have for believing as we do.
It is important to note that on Clifford’s view there is a relationship between belief and
obligation. One has an obligation to only believe upon the basis of sufficient evidence.
Consequently, only when one has sufficient evidence do they have the corresponding right to
believe something. Working behind all of this is his idea about the profoundly social nature of
our beliefs. According to Clifford it is important for us to have properly formed beliefs (i.e., to
only believe when we have the right to) because our beliefs always influence our actions in one
way or another. Likewise our beliefs have many different ways of affecting those around us, the
sorts of beliefs they hold, and by extension the sorts of actions they take. Thus society as a whole
is influenced by one’s believing properly or improperly.11 For this reason he extends the need for
evidence to virtually every kind of belief. There is a universal need for evidence-based beliefs:
“To some up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence.”12 Again at the end of the essay he says, “It is wrong in all cases to believe
on insufficient evidence; and where it is presumption to doubt and to investigate, there it is worse
than presumption to believe.”13
One important implication to be drawn from this is that ensuring the justification of a
given belief will require some measure of intentional, methodological inquiry into the subject
matter at hand. Thus, because the ship owner and the slanderers from Clifford’s examples fail to
perform their epistemic duties (i.e., fail to believe on the basis of the evidence), they are
10

Ibid., 291.
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Ibid., 292.
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Ibid., 295.

13

Ibid., 309.
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therefore not justified in their beliefs. Likewise, if Smith wants to test the justificatory status of
his belief B, what he needs to do is review all of the relevant evidence to see if B is grounded in
sufficient evidence. If, because of the evidence, B is more likely true than false, then he can have
some degree of confidence in believing it. However, he would not be justified in believing B
with complete confidence unless there was indubitable evidence clearly demonstrating its truth.14
Based on this we can classify Clifford’s evidentialism as a deontological theory of justification.
Roughly speaking, deontological justification is the idea “…that being epistemically justified in
believing something is bound up with, or to be analyzed in terms of, one's living up to one's
intellectual duties or responsibilities.”15
This raises a few questions. For instance, what exactly counts as evidence, how do we
have access to it, and what does this mean for epistemology of religion in particular? Clifford
does not address these questions in a systematic or highly detailed fashion. However, I think we
can legitimately surmise from something he says in passing that firsthand experience is the best
kind of evidence and that it should be relied upon as a final authority. While revealing his
intention to discuss inference after discussing testimony, he says: “…and then, further [after
discussing testimony], we shall inquire more generally when and why we may believe that which
goes beyond our own experience, or even beyond the experience of mankind.”16 He seems here
to be taking for granted that firsthand experience is the primary source of justificatory evidence.
In a similar way, Peter Forrest identifies several sorts of evidence that are typically connected
with evidentialism:

14

Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”.

15

George Pappas, “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification”, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013).
16

Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” 296 (emphasis added).
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Here several sorts of evidence are allowed. One consists of beliefs in that which is
“evident to the senses”, that is, beliefs directly due to sense-experience. Another sort of
evidence is that which is “self-evident”, that is, obvious once you think about it. Evidence
may also include the beliefs directly due to memory and introspection. Again moral
convictions might count as evidence, even if not treated as “self-evident”.17
Note that all of these involve some level of experience or other. Thus evidentialism functions
primarily with reference to our firsthand experience and reflection on these experiences.
It is worth mentioning very briefly what Clifford thought of testimony and inference as
they are related to evidence. Testimonial reports can only be counted as evidence when the
testifier’s belief is richly embedded in sufficient evidence. Further, the recipient of the testimony
must have at least some good reason for trusting the reporter. Or, in the very least, they cannot
have any readily available reason for doubting them: “We may believe the statement of another
person, when there is reasonable ground for supposing that he knows the matter of which he
speaks, and that he is speaking the truth so far as he knows it.”18 Inference plays an equally
important role. Just as many of our beliefs are formed on the basis of testimony so many of our
beliefs involve inference at some level. For instance, my belief that the sun will rise tomorrow
cannot be based upon firsthand experience because it is a belief about something in the future
that has not yet come to pass. Thus I infer, based on past experiences, that the future will
resemble the past and thus that the sun will rise. Clifford says that all inference must operate on
the basis of this sort of an assumption whereby, through inductive generalization, what we have
experienced is taken to be representative of and similar to that which we have not yet
experienced. He says, “We may go beyond experience by assuming that what we do not know is
like what we do know; or, in other words, we may add to our experience on the assumption of a

17

Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”.
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Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”, 309.
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uniformity in nature.”19 By including testimony and inference like this Clifford makes his of
justification system far more flexible and inclusive of a much wider range of beliefs.
In this paper, however, we are especially interested in how this sort of evidentialism, as
represented by Clifford, has been applied to epistemology of religion. As briefly mentioned
above, beliefs are to be proportioned to the evidence in such a way that partial and incomplete
evidence can only justify less-than-certain belief. At the same time, only conclusive evidence
justifies certainty in belief.20 Thus there can be varying degrees of confidence corresponding to
varying degrees of evidential force. This principle is taken over directly into epistemology of
religion. The contention, then, is that religious beliefs (e.g., belief in God) must be justified on
the basis of evidence just as any kind of belief must be held in accord with the evidence.
Religious beliefs require evidence and only conclusive evidence can justify certainty in belief.
By and large these evidentialist criteria of justification have been employed to show that
belief in God is at least unjustified and at most irrational. According to Clark, “The evidentialist
objection [to belief in God] may be formalized as follows: (1) Belief in God is rational only if
there is sufficient evidence for the existence of God. (2) There is not sufficient evidence for the
existence of God. (3) Therefore, belief in God is irrational.”21 Premise (1), that belief in God
requires evidence, is based upon the idea that the truth of God’s existence is clearly not
something known in the basis of firsthand experience as outlined above. That is, God’s existence
is not known by sense experience nor is it self-evident. Premise (2), that there is insufficient
evidence, is “…usually based on a negative assessment of the success of theistic proofs or
arguments. Following Hume and Kant, the standard arguments for the existence of God–
19

Ibid., 306.

20

Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”.

21

Clark, “Religious Epistemology”.
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cosmological, teleological and ontological– are judged to be defective in one respect or
another.”22 In addition to this, some problems (e.g., the problem of evil) are typically posed as
counter evidence. On the basis of these sorts of arguments, Antony Flew suggests that “…the
only reasonable posture is that of the negative atheist or the agnostic.”23 In the same way, it is
reported that Bertrand Russell claimed that if he were he were to ever be “Confronted with the
Almighty, [that] he would ask, ‘Sir, why did you not give me better evidence?’.”24
Defenders of the rationality of belief in God have offered several responses to the
evidentialist rejection of belief in God. I will mention three leading lines of response before
formulating a Presuppositional response. For our purposes we can conveniently treat these first
three responses as beginning with a denial of either premise (1), that belief in God requires
evidence, or premise (2), that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God.
Natural Theology
The position roughly known as natural theology represents what is perhaps the most straight
forward reaction to the evidentialist rejection of God. It is straight forward in that it agrees with
the evidentialist position in terms of methodology and differs with it only in terms of results. By
methodology, I mean, the method by which they hope to assess the reasonableness of belief in
God. They agree about what would constitute a good reason for believing in God and thus they
agree about what justification is, at least in this one area. Both views agree that premise (1) is
true; that belief in God requires evidence in order to be rationally and justifiably held. The
natural theologians disagree with the evidentialist rejection of belief in God, then, by negating

22

Clark, “Religious Epistemology”.
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Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism, quoted in Clark, Return To Reason, 3.

24

Leo Rolsten. The Saturday Review, February 23, 1974, pp.25-26. < http://www.unz.org/Pub/SaturdayRev1974feb23-00025>.
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premise (2). That is, they are convinced that rather than pointing to non-theism (i.e., agnosticism
or atheism), the evidence instead points to theism as the most reasonable conclusion.
Classical Natural Theological arguments for God’s existence include cosmological,
teleological, ontological, and design arguments, typically associated with thinkers like Aquinas,
Anselm, and Paley. Consequently, the natural theologians’ main project is to reformulate,
rearticulate, and perhaps supplement these arguments so that they are stronger and more
convincing. While it is beyond the scope this paper to consider the work that has been done this
area, many philosophers and theologians have undertaken exactly this task.25 Some have
undertaken to provide proofs which would justify certainty in believing in God. Others have
settled for demonstrating that based on the evidence there is a great likelihood that God exists
and therefore good reason for some less-that-certain belief in him.26 Thus the debate between
evidentialists and natural theologians is rather straight forward and is understood by both of them
to be a debate entirely over what the evidence suggests.
Wittgensteinian Fideism
Wittgensteinian Fideism stands out as another response to Enlightenment evidentialism and,
more specifically, to similar sorts of challenges that came from the Logical Positivists.27 Before
discussing the position there is one important caveat: although this position bears the name
“Wittgensteinian”, it is not at all clear that Wittgenstein would have endorsed this position or, for

25

Among them are Richard Swineburne, The Existence of God, (New York: Oxford University Press). See also
William Lane Craig, Gary R. Habermas, Paul D. Feinberg in Five Views of Apologetics ed. Steven Cowen, (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing Hosue).
26

27

Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”.

In fact, Logical Positivism may classify as a sub-species of evidentialism or perhaps as an application of
evidentialism to philosophy of language.
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that matter, exactly what he would endorse.28 There is an ongoing debate over how exactly to
interpret his scattered and somewhat enigmatic remarks on religious matters.29 The name is
nevertheless fitting, in a sense, because this approach to epistemology of religion is predicated
upon a distinctively Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy of language and in particular upon
his game theory of meaning.
To understand how a Wittgensteinian Fideist would formulate a response to
Enlightenment evidentialism’s critique of religious belief, we must briefly consider
Wittgenstein’s game theory of meaning in relation to one of its predecessors, the Logical
Positivists. The positivists offered a theory of meaning or a set of criteria by which language was
to be assessed. Roughly speaking, their theory of meaning implied that “…a piece discourse has
meaning if an only if it is either analytically true or false, or capable of verification or
disverification.”30 Thus the presence or absence of meaning was a function of the presence or
absence of a truth value (i.e. being either true or false). The motivation for positivist program
resembles that of Enlightenment evidentialism: both traditions are aimed at restricting careless,
fanatical, or groundless believing. Furthermore, both operate by subjecting beliefs to rigorous
examination and strict criteria that appeal to empirical evidence or firsthand experience.
According to the positivist view, if one can determine the truth value of a given utterance
either by verification or by a priori analysis, then the utterance is meaningful. Likewise, if one

28

Richard Amesbury, “Fideism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013). Amesbury
points that it is very unlikely that that Wittgenstein would have agreed this particular application of his theories. He
further says that “…Wittgensteinians generally regard ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’ as a caricature not only of
Wittgenstein's views but also of their own”.
29

Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Epistemology of Religion,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology ed. Greco and Sosa
(Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 1999) 303-324.
30

Wolterstorff, Epistemology of Religion, 318.
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cannot determine a truth value by such criteria then it is categorized as meaningless.31 On this
view only some non-abstract pieces of discourse were considered to be genuinely meaningful.
Metaphysical language, ethical language, and religious language, as a result, were all considered
meaningless. This is because they do not have truth values that can be easily determined
according to the strict positivist criteria.32 Thus, while the Enlightenment evidentialist would
claim that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God, the positivist would argue a more
radical point: because religious beliefs are not the sorts of things that can be empirically or
analytically verified, they are in fact not even truly meaningful. Again, religious language is not
meaningful in the way that scientific discourse is clearly meaningful and straightforwardly
descriptive of the apparent states of affairs.
In his later work, and most clearly in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein
responded in opposition to the positivist view by proposing an altogether different theory of
meaning. He vigorously opposed the labeling of all religious language as meaningless. He
thought that “…if an interpretation of religion makes religious seem silly, pointless, or
outmoded, that interpretation should be dismissed out of hand as not knowing what it is talking
about.”33 Rather, there must be some other way of understanding meaning whereby
metaphysical, ethical, and religious language is not meaningless per se, but also isn’t to be
assessed by the same exact criteria as more “scientific” sorts of language. The solution, for
Wittgenstein, was to think about meaning in terms of its use and use in terms of what he called
“forms of life”. Forms of life, very roughly speaking, are ways of getting along in the world that
31

Notice that these two statements merely parse out the earlier bicondational: “…a piece of discourse has meaning if
and only if it is either analytically true or false, or capable of verification or disverification” (Wolterstorff, 318,
emphasis added).
32

Ibid., 318-19.

33

Ibid.
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are shared by groups of people. A group of people who partake in a common form of life have a
set of assumptions or a shared understanding which loosely unites them. Furthermore, such a
group of people have a common or shared understanding about how to speak and use language.
Thus they can be said to be playing the same “language game”. Their common form of life
provides them with a loose set of implicit rules for the game. These rules govern what utterances
are meaningful or count as legitimate “moves” within the game. Thus an utterance is meaningful
based on its function within a language game.34
This theory is then applied to epistemology of religion in such a way that religious
believers are said to be playing a certain language game.35 There are several components
underlying this particular application the game theory of meaning that are well worth bringing to
light. Richard Amesbury articulates several of these underlying theses:
According to this interpretation [of Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning], religion is a selfcontained and primarily expressive enterprise, governed by its own internal logic or
“grammar.” This view—commonly called Wittgensteinian Fideism—is variously
characterized as entailing one or more of the following distinct (but arguably interrelated) theses: (1) that religion is logically cut off from other aspects of life; (2) that
religious discourse is essentially self-referential and does not allow us to talk about
reality; (3) that religious beliefs can be understood only by religious believers; and (4)
that religion cannot be criticized.36
With these underlying commitments in mind, the fideistic nature of this position becomes quite
clear. The fact that religious language is fundamentally expressive seems to be the ground for its
logically isolated character. The logically isolated character, in turn, is what earns this position
the title “fideism”. Fideism, here, is roughly any position that sees the pursuit of religious truth

34

Anat Biletzki, “Ludwig Wittgenstein,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013).
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As mentioned above, this interpretation and application of his theory of meaning is not entirely uncontroversial. In
fact, some interpreters would argue that this is a misreading, an oversimplification, and a misapplication of this
theory of meaning. For an example, see Dallas High’s Logic, Persons, and Belief, (New York: Oxford Univeristy
Press, 1967) 27-130.
36

Amesbury, “Fideism”.
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as about faith and not about reason. Thus fideism will sometimes involve a commitment to
religious belief without reasons to back it up at all. In more radical instances it may even allow
for belief in spite of reasons to the contrary.
In a similar fashion, Peter Forrest says that Wittgensteinian Fideism involves both an
“autonomy thesis” and an “incommensurability” thesis.37 First, the autonomy thesis is roughly
that religious beliefs can only be seen as justified in terms of internal criteria. According to this
thesis, each religion is its own free-standing, self-referential entity. Second, there is an
incommensurability thesis which says, roughly, “…that religious utterances are unlike scientific
or metaphysical claims and so we are confusing different uses of language if we judge religious
utterances by the standards of science or metaphysics.”38 Thus religious language is not taken to
function in the exact same way that scientific and metaphysical language purports to be about or
descriptive of the world. They are being used in different ways and for different purposes. This is
similar to what Wolterstorff says in his formulation of Wittgensteinian Fideism39:
Religious “belief” and the language used to express it, these often pictorial in character,
give expression to one’s religious form of life and are at the same time a component
therein…Thus, to verbalize a religious “belief” is to express, often in pictorial language,
some aspect of one’s religious form of life – while at the same time engaging in that form
of life.40
On this formulation, religious language is primarily expressive as opposed to more scientific
language which purports to be descriptive of extramental things. In order to understand what is
meant by a religious utterance, that is, what it expresses, one must of course be a participant in
that form of life. At the same time, in order to know that something is meaningless, or not a
37

Forrest, “Epistemology of Religion”.
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Ibid.
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Nicholas Wolterstorff, of course, is not a Wittgensteinian Fideist. The passage I am about to cite is part of a book
chapter in which he outlines the position in question.
40

Wolterstorff, Epistemology of Religion, 319.
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genuine expression of the form of life, one must likewise have a participant’s perspective. In the
final analysis this formulation of Wittgensteinian Fideism appears to be a modified version of
positivism.41 After all, it appears as though this theory still bars religious language from being
genuinely descriptive of reality in a way that scientific language is. A religious speaker, then,
who says that “There is a God,” is not uttering something that is true or false, but is rather
expressing something. For many religious thinkers, however, such a theory will not do.42 They
require a more robust, realistic understanding of their truth claims.
In any case, a Wittgensteinian Fideist of this sort has the resources to overturn the
positivist accusation that religious language is meaningless. Such language is not meaningless
per se. It simply has meaning in a way that is different from more straightforward scientific
language. It is just that it is embedded in a different form of life and thus part of a different
language game. But what of the evidentialists’ claim that belief in God is nevertheless
unreasonable because it is not based upon sufficient evidence? The Wittgensteinian Fideists
stand ready with an answer: “while it is appropriate to ask questions about justification within a
language game it is a mistake to ask about the justification of “playing” the game in question. In
this way epistemology is relativised to language games, themselves related to forms of life, and
the one used for assessing religious claims is less stringent than evidentialism.”43 Thus,
according to Wittgensteinian Fideism, the evidentialist objection to belief in God may be rejected
as irrelevant. Unless it is inherent in a given religious system that their beliefs should be argued
for according to evidentialist criteria then such criteria do not apply.
41

Wolterstorff, Epistemology of Religion, 319.
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Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve deeper into this topic and consider any modified or
augmented forms of Wittgensteinian Fideism that allow for non-expressive, cognitively meaningful interpretations
of religious and theological language.
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Consider this in terms of the evidentialist objection to belief in God as formalized above.
While the natural theologian denied premise (2), that there is there is insufficient evidence for
belief in God, the Wittgensteinian Fideist have taken a quite different approach. Earlier we said
that the natural theologian agreed with the evidentialist in terms of methodology and differed
with them only in their evaluation of the evidence (and thus in their conclusion as well). The
Wittgensteinian Fideist, on the other hand, would clearly disagree with them in terms of
methodology. That is, they would deny premise (1), that belief in God is the kind of belief that
needs to be justified on the basis of evidence.
Reformed Epistemology
The next alternative to Enlightenment evidentialism to consider is the so-called Reformed
Epistemology is. Like the Wittgensteinian Fideists they ultimately deny premise (1); that belief
in God must be based upon argument and evidence. However, they do this for quite different
reasons. In their denial of premise (1), they begin by directly attacking evidentialism itself and
then by arguing that it is reasonable for one to believe in God without propositional evidence.
Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and William Alston are among the more prominent and
well-known Reformed Epistemologists.44
In the first place the Reformed Epistemology objection begins by making explicit the sort
of noetic structure that is implied by Enlightenment evidentialism. By a noetic structure is meant
the way in which one’s beliefs and their justification are related to or connected with each
other.45 The Reformed Epistemologists argue that Enlightenment evidentialism entails a sort of
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foundationalism.46 Generally speaking, foundationalism refers to the idea that some of our
beliefs are basic while others are non-basic. Basic beliefs are accepted and justifiably believed on
their own and not in connection with other beliefs. These beliefs are like the foundation of a
building. Other beliefs, however, can be “built” upon these beliefs. These are non-basic beliefs.
We believe these things on the basis of other, basic, beliefs. Non-basic beliefs are inferred from
basic beliefs. These non-basic beliefs correspond to the super-structure of a building that is built
upon the foundation. The all-important question that this begs is which beliefs are considered
basic and why.
As we saw in the above treatment of Clifford’s essay, evidentialism ultimately relies
upon firsthand experience. Thus, for the evidentialist, a basic belief is justified if and only if it is
“self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible” and a non-basic belief is justified if and only
if it is “…inferable from a set of beliefs that are self-evident, evident to the senses, or
incorrigible.”47

We may refer to this position as “classical foundationalism”.48 This

foundationalist commitment ultimately explains why the evidentialists hold that belief in God
demands evidence. Belief in God is clearly non-basic (because it fails to meet the criteria for
being basic). Thus, by definition, it must be inferred or deduced from a set of propositions (i.e. it
needs to be based on propositional evidence). Reformed Epistemologist attack this assumption.
Their general strategy is to show that if this position is consistently applied then it turns
out to be self-defeating. Evidentialism is, they maintain, self-referentially incoherent and should
be dismissed without hesitation. To elucidate this point they begin by showing that very few
46
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beliefs can be justified according to strict evidentialist criteria. Accordingly, Kelly James Clark
points out some of our limitations when it comes to classical foundationalism:
The first problem with the evidentialist objection is that the universal demand for
evidence simply cannot be met in a large number of cases with the cognitive equipment
that we have. No one has ever been able to offer proofs for the existence of other persons,
inductive beliefs (e.g., that the sun will rise in the future), or the reality of the past
(perhaps, as Bertrand Russell cloyingly puzzled, we were created five minutes ago with
our memories intact) that satisfy [evidentialist] requirements for proof.49
Thus evidentialism is automatically suspect because, if consistently applied, it seems to rob us of
a number of beliefs that we normally take to be very secure. This seems to create something of a
dilemma for evidentialists. For instance, if they say we that we may believe without evidence
that other people have minds, then they have abandoned the very heart of their program: that
“…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient
evidence.”50 On the other hand, if they say that we cannot believe in other minds without proof
then their theory will devolve into a fairly straightforward skepticism about almost any truthregarding claim. The Reformed Epistemologist’s point here, or one of their points, is that is that
belief in God is like belief in other minds. The two seem to sink or swim together.51
These concerns, however, do not in and of themselves amount to a refutation of
evidentialism. Rather, it only shows that if it is the correct position to hold then in the final
analysis we are justified in believing only a few things. In order to formulate a refutation of
evidentialism based upon these observations the Reformed Epistemologist will need to do more.
This, however, is not a terribly daunting task. One must simply subject evidentialism or classical
foundationalism to its own standards and see that it collapses under its own weight. The crucial
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question is why should someone believe that evidentialism or classical foundationalism is the
correct or best theory of justification? The tenets of classical foundationalism are not selfevident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible. Thus, they are not themselves basic beliefs.
Therefore, by their own standard, in order for them to be justifiably believed, they must be
inferable from a set of such basic beliefs. This, however, is not an easy task and has not yet been
done. From this, Clark concludes that classical foundationalism “…by its own account, is
irrational. If classical foundationalism were true, it would be irrational to accept it. Better simply
to reject it!”52 Thus, Enlightenment evidentialism can be aptly described as self-referentially
incoherent.53 On this basis the evidentialist objection to belief in God can be overturned.
From here the Reformed Epistemologist can move on and work towards giving an
account for why belief in God is in fact justified. To see they do this it will help to compare and
contrast some underlying commitments of both evidentialists and Reformed Epistemologists.
Despite their rejection of classical foundationalism, Reformed Epistemologists, in the final
analysis, actually hold onto a version of foundationalism and modify it adopting some
externalist, and specifically reliabilist, elements.
Above we classified evidentialism as a deontological theory of justification; that is, a
view which maintains that justification is fundamentally about to living up to one’s epistemic
duties. Such a view can be more generally categorized as “internalist” epistemology because, on
this view, the justification of a given belief is a matter of whether some conditions internal to the
believer have been met or not. Reformed Epistemology, on the other hand, is an “externalist”
epistemology, meaning that justification is a matter of whether some conditions external to a
believer have been met or not. The question, then, becomes what are these person-external
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criteria for justification? For the Reformed Epistemologist, the criteria involve reliable
knowledge sources. Thus, they are reliabilists, meaning that beliefs formed according properly
functioning belief-forming mechanisms are taken to be justified.54 We will outline their specific
criteria in greater detail below, for now it is sufficient to note that the Reformed Epistemologists
are externalists and the evidentialists are internalists.
Despite these initial differences, both evidentialists and Reformed Epistemologists have
the same view about the architecture of knowledge. That is, both subscribe to some form of
foundationalism. The differences outlined above reveal differences in the criteria of justification
and have implications for what each view take to be basic beliefs. Thus, when Plantinga rejects
evidentialism with its classical foundationalism, he is concerned with the rejection of their
criteria for what counts as basic and not with rejecting foundationalism per se. Clark points out
that,
Where his foundationalism departs from classical foundationalism is in his specification
of properly basic beliefs. The classical foundationalist has a rather sparse set of properly
basic beliefs. Plantinga’s foundationalism is much less parsimonious in its specification
of properly basic beliefs. He also includes memory beliefs, beliefs about the external
world, acceptance of testimony, and belief in God, among others.55
Thus, they contend that belief in God is justified insofar as it is indeed a basic belief. The
question that this now raises is why can it be taken as basic? How is it possible to have this more
liberal set of foundational beliefs? In the first place, it is helpful to notice that the reason for
rejecting belief in God as non-basic has been removed because the classical foundationalist
criteria for basicality have been removed. Thus, there is no reason why it cannot be considered
properly basic. This, however, seems to open the door for almost any belief to considered basic.
Thus, the next task for the reformed epistemologist is to show why belief in God is somehow
54
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special and worthy of being considered basic while other beliefs, such as the belief in Santa
Clause, is not.56
The Reformed Epistemologist thus needs some criteria for basic belief that allows belief
in God to be basic and yet is not so permissive as to allow just anything to be considered
properly basic. By properly basic is meant any belief that does not need inferential support.
Plantinga says that the way to go about this is to consider how certain beliefs can be considered
basic in some situations but not in others. For instance, if I am being presented with the image of
a tree, then, all things being equal, I can take my belief that there is a tree before me as basic; it
does not need inferential support. If, however, I am not in a situation where I am having such
presentations then I cannot have properly basic beliefs about a tree being in front of me. The
same holds true for belief in God:
What the Reformed Epistemologist holds is that there are widely realized circumstances
in which belief in God is properly basic; but why should that commit him to the idea that
just about any belief is properly basic in any circumstances, or even to the vastly weaker
claim that for any belief there are circumstances in which it is properly basic?...the fact
that he rejects the criterion of proper basicality purveyed by classical foundationalism
does not mean that he is committed to supposing just anything is properly basic.57
On this basis belief in God can be considered properly basic without this resulting in the absurd
consequence of any belief being considered properly basic as well. This solution, however, raises
still further questions. Most importantly, how do we know that the circumstances are realized
such that belief in God is in fact properly basic? While Plantinga does deal with this issue58, we
need not entertain the issue further. It is sufficient to note that, at least “…in Faith and Reason
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the emphasis is on epistemic rights” as opposed to epistemic obligations.59 That is, Plantinga is
here arguing that one is within their epistemic rights when they believe in God without
argumentation, and he is not arguing that one therefore must believe in God.
Towards Presuppositionalist Rejection of Evidentialism: The Myth of Neutrality
In the last section we considered some of the main contours of the discussion in contemporary
epistemology of religion. Following Peter Forrest we have viewed this as a debate over whether
Enlightenment evidentialism should inform the belief component of religious faith. With this
background we can now turn to the main focus of the paper: an alternative response to
Enlightenment evidentialism that finds its origins in the Christian Presuppositional method of
apologetics. While the previous responses have involved epistemological debate, this alternative
involves some meta-philosophical concerns which are in turn motivated by certain theological
concerns. As mentioned in an earlier footnote, what follows will not be a full-bodied formulation
of the Presuppositional method of apologetics, but just a formulation how they might reject
Enlightenment evidentialism. Thus we will not need to frame these meta-philosophical concerns
in terms of their theological foundations. Rather, we can appreciate these meta-philosophical
concerns by framing them as a response to Enlightenment evidentialism.60 This will involve four
topics of discussion: I.) an unavoidable interdependence between epistemology and metaphysics,
II.) the nature of presuppositions and ultimate truth criterion, III.) how these two topics can be
woven together to elucidate the concept of a worldview, and then, IV.) what all of this means for
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epistemology of religion and how this can be formulated as rejection of Enlightenment
evidentialism.
I.) The Interdependence of Metaphysics and Epistemology
In chapter 3 of his Presuppositional Apologetics, Greg Bahnsen argues for the unavoidable
interdependence of metaphysics and epistemology.61 On this view, metaphysics and
epistemology are necessarily and unavoidably related. Neither of these areas of inquiry has
complete primacy over the other and neither can be done in a way that is truly independent of the
other. Rather they have a relationship whereby no advances can be made in either field without
necessitating some conclusions the other. For instance, one cannot develop a metaphysic without
an epistemological method underwriting it. If someone attempted to, their theory would be no
more than unjustified, ungrounded conjecture. Likewise one cannot develop an epistemological
system without reference to and dependence upon some necessary metaphysical conclusions.
The relationship between the areas of inquiry can thus be described as unavoidably circular. Of
primary importance for us here is that there are no metaphysically neutral theories of knowledge.
Bahnsen begins in his argument for this by addressing what he believes to be a common
misunderstanding in philosophical methodology. He asserts that in our day there is a common
but mistaken view which says that we can “…settle matters concerning epistemology and
method prior to, and in abstraction from, questions of metaphysics.”62 He then goes on to expose
the error in this view. I will expand upon his work and illustrate the nature of their independence
from two different perspectives. First we will consider how we argue for or come to believe in
theories of justification and knowledge. I will show that such argumentation, if it will be
convincing at all, will involve reliance upon some previously held metaphysical beliefs.
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Secondly, we will consider how theories of knowledge and justification in and of themselves
entail some metaphysical conclusions. From both of these perspectives we will see that
epistemology should not be thought of as a metaphysically neutral inquiry.
Part of Bahnsen’s argument hinges upon a problem with defending theories of
justification. Justification is something that can be ascribed to either beliefs or believers. When a
belief is justified this means, at minimum, that our affirming of this belief is reasonable. That is,
when we affirm that the belief is true we do so in a way that is not in violation of the basic
canons of good epistemic practice. Similarly, when a believer is justified this means in the act of
believing they are not violating these basic canons of good epistemic practice. Also, when
believers are justified, they can usually expect their belief to be true. I suggest, along with
Bahnsen, that a functional commonality in various theories of justification is that justification
always involves some connection or other between beliefs, the truth or falsity of these beliefs,
and the expectation that a believer has that his beliefs are indeed true. That is, regardless of what
specific criteria and theories are offered, they are always offered, at least in part, for the sake of
ensuring the maximum amount of true beliefs and the minimum amount of false beliefs. “…The
notion of justified belief is related to that of true belief in that justifying reasons for a belief are
those that will most [often] lead a person to hold beliefs that are true.”63 Thus, the justification of
a belief and the truth of this belief are always related. At the very least they are related in that
justificational theories are supposed increase the likelihood that we will end up with true beliefs.
To illustrate these points, consider what happens if Smith proposes J, his theory of
justification. One of his intentions when offering J, if not his chief intention, is that if its criteria
are met then we will have an increased likelihood of having true beliefs in a non-accidental,
knowledge-creating way. If the criteria laid out in J are met and there are no defeaters, then our
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true beliefs can count as knowledge (at least according to the view that knowledge is something
like justified true belief). However, if we have a conversation with Smith and he tells us about
his theory J, we would do well to ask why he maintains that J is the best justificational theory to
hold. Or, far less stringently, we should ask why he maintains that it is valuable for the
justification of some of his beliefs some of the time.
The kind of answers given to these questions illustrates some of the interdependence of
metaphysics and epistemology that I wish to point out. Given the connection between
justification and true beliefs just described, any theory of justification that is proposed will have
to be argued for, to some degree, on the basis of its success. That is, a theory of justification can
only be seen as tenable if it can be argumentatively demonstrated that the theory does in fact
provide some truth-ensuring criteria. This is because it is the very purpose of the theory of
justification is to provide some criteria according to which beliefs may be counted on as being
true (or at least counted on as being more likely true than false). The unavoidable problem is that
any argumentation or reasons given for a theory of justification must necessarily make reference
to some already-known-to-be-true states of affairs:
The kind of [criteria] that will be sanctioned as offering “justification” for belief… will
be so selected because these lead to beliefs counted as true in a satisfactory number of
cases…justification is conferred on certain [criteria] because of the relatively high degree
of success they have in engendering true belief…Now if types of [criteria] are to be
sanctioned in this fashion, it is obvious that knowledge of the existing states of affairs is
essential. One could not estimate the success factor for particular kinds of [criteria] unless
he possessed some knowledge of truth (propositions corresponding to existing states of
affairs) with which to make comparisons…Epistemological considerations are not
capricious guesses; they are given because someone feels they are appropriate for the
reality in which he lives.64
Thus, the only way Smith can know that his theory is the best one is if he has he somehow
already has sufficient knowledge the states of affairs. Likewise, in order to argue for his theory
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he must at some point make reference to this same pool of knowledge. Indeed, the only way
anyone can have reasons for holding their preferred theory of justification is if they “…already
know something about the world.”65 The conclusion that Bahnsen draws from this is that is
impossible, in terms of philosophical methodology, to begin by developing an epistemological
theory without reference to at least some beliefs about what the world is roughly like (a
metaphysical question).66 Put concisely, we do not come to hold theories of knowledge and
justification in a philosophical vacuum. Instead, we become convinced of one theory or another
only upon careful reflection on the system in question and always with reference to our previous
life experience, i.e. some beliefs about the reality in which we live.
To be clear I am not at this point going so far as to say that every epistemology always
brings in some full, robust metaphysical system (though some philosophies seem do something
like this, e.g. Plato’s theory of the forms, which supports to both his metaphysical and his
epistemological theories). Rather, I am arguing for the less controversial but easily overlooked
point that epistemology is never a metaphysically neutral subject matter. In order for a theory of
knowledge to be convincing to us to we must rely on some underlying beliefs depicting what the
states of affairs are at least roughly like. Only with recourse to such beliefs can we validate a
theory of knowledge. Thus we can see that there is some interdependence between metaphysics
and epistemology at least in the sense that we are unable to develop or believe theories of
justification without reliance upon some beliefs about the states of affairs. These beliefs fall
under the category of metaphysics, broadly conceived.
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To further illustrate this conclusion we can briefly consider theories of knowledge and
justification from another perspective. Rather than investigating how we become convinced of
certain theories, we can consider the content and structure of these theories in and of themselves.
To do this we could review small web of general metaphysical presuppositions that hang
together and underwrite theories of knowledge and justification.67 I would like to suggest that
these kinds of metaphysical beliefs are universal and unavoidable for all epistemological
systems.68 First, every theory of knowledge necessarily presupposes, at the very least, that
human beings do in fact have a sufficient mental capacity for entertaining beliefs about some
part of the reality in which they live, whatever that reality may be. Secondly, these theories
always involve some explanation of how we actually come to, or should come to, hold beliefs
about whatever parts of reality are available to us. That is, epistemological and justificational
theories make reference to and rely upon some particular faculties or knowledge sources that are
taken to be the grounds for our beliefs. In the final analysis though, these two presuppositions
can be collapsed into one: that we are connected to our environment in some epistemic manner;
that because the states of affairs are what they are, our faculties in conjunction with our
environment can engender some beliefs about these states of affairs.
The very idea of a justificational theory or a theory of knowledge presupposes some state
of affairs whereby we are epistemically connected to our environment in an appropriate way.
When a theory of justification or some criterion for knowledge is offered, this involves taking a
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stance on the specific nature of our epistemic connection with our environment and then parsing
out some of the ramifications of this connection. Taking such stance as this entails, at least
implicitly, some further stance about what the states of affairs roughly are or what the world is
roughly like. Again, this is not to say that such a theory necessarily smuggles in or implies some
robust, systematized metaphysic, but rather that it is at least not a metaphysically neutral theory.
Put concisely, since a theory of justification or knowledge involves some specific epistemic
connection to the world, it thus presupposes some states of affairs which match this theory. To
illustrate this in somewhat generic terms, consider empiricism and rationalism. Both of these
systems presuppose that we have some sort of epistemic connection with reality. At the same
time, however, they disagree over exactly what this connection is like. Roughly speaking, an
empiricist believes that this connection is fundamentally mediated by our senses while a
rationalist believes that it is by our rational faculties. Consequently, both the empiricist and the
rationalist would have to give at least slightly different accounts of the states of affairs. That is,
their epistemological systems have slightly different metaphysical presuppositions.
To continue with this example, in order for the empiricist to have the best theory, it must
be the case that the states of affairs roughly correspond to or at least do not contradict their view
that we are epistemically connected to our environment through our senses. These states of
affairs are, at least to some degree, different from the states of affairs that undergird the
rationalist position. Consider, alternatively, the position of some radical skeptics. A radical
skeptic, for our purposes, can be defined as one who denies that there is an epistemic connection
with the world or at least denies that we can know about such an epistemic connection if there is
one. I would suggest that such a skeptic is no more metaphysically neutral than the rationalist or
empiricist. To be sure, they are not advancing any metaphysical theses and would be quick to
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point out reasons for doubting any metaphysical theses. However, the very assertion that there is
no epistemic connection with reality, or that we cannot know about such a connection, is a
metaphysically loaded assertion. In his view, the skeptic is dependent upon the states of affairs
being one and not another; namely, that there is no epistemic connection between us and the
outside world or that at least that if there is one that we cannot know about it with certainty.
From this discussion may rightly conclude that there is no metaphysical neutrality when
it comes to epistemology. It is not as though we can develop or become convinced of a theory of
knowledge or justification without recourse to some beliefs about what the world is like. We also
saw that justificational theories and theories of knowledge always entail some metaphysical
beliefs. If it is true that epistemology and metaphysics are connected in this way, then debate
between adherents of radically different systems can be somewhat problematic. We will turn to
this now.
II.) Presuppositions and Ultimate Truth Criteria
Having established that metaphysics and epistemology are unavoidably connected in this way,
we can now start to touch upon a similar point about philosophical argumentation. In this section
we will consider the kinds of standards that are appealed to when determining whether a given
proposition is true or false. To do this we will consider two overlapping topics: presuppositions
and ultimate truth criteria. Much of this section is a reflection of John Frame’s work.69
Frame describes a presupposition as a kind belief that one is committed to in a
foundational sort of way. He contends that amongst our wide network of beliefs there are some
beliefs that play a more basic role and foundational upon which other beliefs are built, as it were.
Frame first offers a general definition of presuppositions: “A presupposition is a belief that takes

69

Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God 3-14, Frame, A Doctrine of the Knowledge of God 45 and 125-133; and
his contribution to Five Views on Apologetics 208-231.

32
precedence over another and therefore serves as a criterion for another.”70 Take, for instance, the
law of non-contradiction: that a thing cannot be both P and not-P at the same time and in the
same sense. While we do not very often entertain the belief that this law obtains, it is
nevertheless is foundational in that it undergirds just about all of our thinking and argumentation
and functions as a criterion according to which other beliefs are judged. In this way it is
presupposed in just about all of our thinking. In addition to this, he specifies a certain kind of
presupposition that he calls an “ultimate presupposition”. As the name indicates, he uses this
term to refer to a presuppositional belief “…over which no other takes precedence.”71 That is,
there are certain presuppositions that are held onto or committed to with a special degree of
commitment. Frame says of these kinds of presuppositions that:
Everyone has them because everyone has some commitment that at a particular time
(granted, it may change) is “basic” to him. Everyone has a scale of values in which one
loyalty takes precedence over another until we reach one that takes precedence over all
the rest. That value is that person’s presupposition, his basic commitment, his ultimate
criterion.72
The idea is that if we ask someone why they believe what they believe they will likely offer
some other belief or reason. If we kept pressing them and asking give further reasons for these
reasons, they will eventually arrive at some basic kind of commitment like this that is not
supported by some deeper more foundational commitment. At this point we will have reached
the end of the chain of their beliefs, we have arrived a belief with no further external support.
It is worth noting some of the differences between presuppositions in general and
ultimate presuppositions. In addition to the level of precedence, there also appears to be
difference in exactly what kind of beliefs they are and how they are held. When offering his
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general definition of presuppositions, Frame simply classifies them as a sort of belief that takes
precedence over other beliefs. However, when defining ultimate presuppositions, he adds that
they are a sort of value or loyalty. I bring this up to point out that, on Frame’s view, ultimate
presuppositions seem to be more akin to dispositions or tendencies than to mere propositional
beliefs. That is, while ultimate presuppositions are without a doubt a certain kind of belief which
entails propositional content, they are often held onto and reasoned from as though they were
something very valuable and indeed worth being loyal to and committed to. For this reason it is
difficult to elucidate what exactly an ultimate presupposition is without using some theological
or religious language. For instance, a Christian’s ultimate presupposition or ultimate
commitment should be to Jesus Christ as King, Savior, Lord, and God, “…and hence his word is
the very criterion, the ultimate standard of truth”.73 The contention is that there are “nonreligious” analogues such that everyone, the religious and the non-religious alike, have ultimate
commitments. For instance, one may be committed to the idea that the basic deliverances of
reason or sense perception are sufficient arbiters of truth; that we should trust these deliverances
as the final authority and condition for truthfulness in all areas of inquiry. Thus, without adhering
to any religious doctrines, one may nevertheless have an ultimate commitment that is
functionally analogous to that of the Christian’s ultimate commitment to Jesus Christ.
Frame maintains that these ultimate presuppositions are a kind of commitment that is
brought into all of our thinking because they govern all of our thinking. That is, all of our ideas
are either built upon it as a foundation or are brought into conformity with it somehow. Thus
they are normative beliefs in the sense that they regulate other beliefs or provide some standard
by which they can be judged. For this reason he describes them as ultimate truth criteria.74 An
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ultimate truth criterion is some belief about what our knowledge sources ultimately are and how
we ultimately have access to truth. Beliefs of this sort are placed high above other beliefs, given
precedence, and taken to be a trustworthy and reliable standard for judging all other beliefs and
ideas. To use the language from above, they involve a belief about what our epistemic
connection with reality is. Thus they tell us how we should ultimately go about our philosophical
inquiry. Put in other words, an ultimate truth criterion reveals what final authority that we appeal
to in making judgments about what is true and false. Naturally, these sorts of commitments or
beliefs serve as the basis for a given philosophical system. The empiricist, for example, holds
onto sense perception as the reliable truth-determining authority and thus builds his philosophical
system in a way that is governed by this truth criterion. Likewise the rationalist holds that human
reason is the ultimate truth criterion and thus builds a system in line with this truth criterion.
An important question that comes to mind is how do people come to hold to such a
criterion and how can they argue for why their criterion should he held over against another?
Though it may sound strange at first glance, ultimate truth criteria cannot be believed in or
argued for in a non-circular way.75 This is because, by definition, an ultimate presupposition is
not held onto for any reason beyond itself. This does not mean that they are necessarily picked
out in an arbitrary fashion and without any reason whatsoever.76 Ultimate presuppositions are
typically held because of what is taken to be some inherent virtue of the belief itself. The
rationalist and empiricist both espouse truth criterion that have at least some prima facie
attractiveness. According to Frame, every philosophical system or belief system holds to some
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ultimate truth criterion or other in this manner; that is, in virtue of some inherent quality of the
truth criterion itself. An implication of this point is that any argument for such a truth criterion
must rely upon that criterion:
Every philosophy must use its own standards in proving its conclusions; otherwise it is
simply inconsistent. Those who believe that human reason is the ultimate authority
(rationalists) must presuppose the authority if reason in their arguments for rationalism.
Those who believe in the ultimacy of sense experience must presuppose it in arguing for
their philosophy (empiricism). And skeptics must be skeptical of their skepticism (a fact
that is, of course, the Achilles’ heel of skepticism). The point is that when one is arguing
for an ultimate criterion, whether Scripture, the Koran, human reason, sensation, or
whatever, one must use criteria compatible with that conclusion. If that is circularity, then
everybody is guilty of circularity.77
The purpose of this discussion is to suggest and illustrate that there is no philosophical neutrality
when it comes to discussing criterion for truth. It is impossible to offer a cogent argument for one
truth criterion or another without presupposing that truth criterion in the argument and then
arguing by that criterion.
III.) Worldviews
The last two sections have shown that philosophical neutrality or non-circularity is not as easy to
come by as one might initially assume. In the first section this came out when we saw that there
are no metaphysically neutral ways to actually argue for a theory of knowledge. Likewise,
theories of knowledge in and of themselves always entail some metaphysical commitments. We
also saw that there is no philosophical neutrality when it comes to the discussion of ultimate truth
criterion. While these first two sections involved a negative assertion, that philosophical
neutrality is impossible in these areas, in the present section we will consider a positive assertion:
that because there is no philosophical neutrality in these areas that therefore our thinking and
reasoning is relative to a “worldview” as will be defined shortly.
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Given the impossibility of neutrality and the fact that we cannot reason without
presuppositions it should come as no surprise that equally rational people can arrive at
completely different and even contradictory understandings of what the world is like. In fact it is
easy to see why this happens once we acknowledge our circular reliance upon presuppositions
and that the fact that these epistemological commitments entail at least some further
metaphysical commitments. Suppose, for instance, that Smith and Jones have different ultimate
truth criterion. Not only will they have to argue for these commitment in the circular way
described above, but they must also presuppose some necessary metaphysical conclusions to
match their truth criterion. What this means is that before they have even begun in their
philosophical inquiry they already have at least slightly different views of what some states of
affairs are like. In the same way they already have different conceptions of what will make for a
convincing argument and what will suffice as evidence for a given proposition. These differences
begin to show as they start to consider different philosophical questions. As Bahnsen says,
What take to be problems, what kind of analysis they say is required, and what methods
and standards they use will all be viewed differently. What each school sees as
amounting to “making a good case” for a basic position – what each will count as
plausible or not – depends on their own initial perspectives or presuppositions.78
The result of this is that since Smith and Jones start from different positions they may differ
greatly in their understanding of the world. They may well provide contradictory answers to
various philosophical questions they ask. If pressed, they are liable to offer different views of
what the world is ultimately like.
These observations about presuppositions suggest that all of our reasoning and thinking is
ultimately worldview-thinking. By this I mean that the non-neutral, presuppositional bases that
we all work from can, and do, serve as grounds for other beliefs that are formed in a systematic
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or coherent way. In reasoning from our basic presuppositions we tend to develop a worldview.
To be sure, our presuppositions do not in and of themselves constitute a robust worldview.
Nevertheless they do serve as the implicit guides in developing and systematizing one. Most
basically, then, a worldview is a somewhat systematized, coherent understanding or
interpretation of what the world is like. A worldview thus consists of the answers to a number of
crucial philosophical questions. According to Bahnsen, “Each worldview has its presuppositions
about reality, knowledge, and ethics; these mutually influence and support each other.”79
Likewise, Clément Vidal offers a comprehensive list of worldview questions that include:
(a) What is? Ontology (model of being);
(b) Where does it all come from? Explanation (model of the past);
(c) Where are we going? Prediction (model of the future);
(d) What is good and what is evil? Axiology (theory of values);
(e) How should we act? Praxeology (theory of actions).
(f) What is true and what is false? Epistemology (theory of knowledge);
(g) Where do we start to answer those questions?80
As we are faced with these sorts of philosophical questions the way in which we answer them, as
mentioned above, will hinge upon our ultimate truth criterion and ultimate commitments.
Likewise, our answers will most likely cohere with the answers we give for other questions.
There are many questions that this raises and a handful of implications that should be drawn
from this.
First, one might ask if everyone has a worldview. It has already been established that
everyone must make use of presuppositions if they are to reason at all. But does it follow from
this that everyone must participate in the philosophical inquiry that seems to be necessary for the
development and identification of a worldview? Must one intentionally consider these
79
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philosophical questions in order have a worldview? In answer to this question, Vidal makes the
distinction between implicit and explicit worldviews: “Most people adopt and follow a
worldview without much thinking. Their worldview remains implicit. They intuitively have a
representation of the world (components (a)-(c)), know what is good and what is bad (component
(d)) and have experience on how to act in the world (component (e)). And this is enough to get
by.”81 On the other hand, an explicit worldview is one that has been developed and adopted in a
more intentionally. In such cases “…some curious, reflexive, critical, thinking or philosophical
minds wake up, and start to question their worldviews. They aspire to make it explicit.”82 In
addition to this distinction, he also asserts that everyone is in need of a worldview. We will
consider this in just a moment. Before this, we will take up a question that is a corollary to the
implicit/explicit distinction.
If it is possible for a worldview to be held either explicitly or implicitly, then what is it
like to have a worldview? Or what is a worldview like? One analogy that can be readily made is
that a worldview is like a pair of glasses. A worldview is like a lens through which one views
(i.e. interprets or understands) everything in their experience. Just as one who wears glasses
might forget that they are wearing them so awareness of our worldview can be implicit and need
not be at the forefront of one’s thinking. Another feature of this analogy is that it can be used to
illustrate some of the difficulty associated with thinking about one’s own worldview. We almost
always look through our glasses. It is only by intentionally deciding to look at one’s glasses, and
much strain on the eyes, that we can actually adjust our focus and look at the lenses that are
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before our eyes. Much in the same way it is difficult, especially at first, to examine one’s own
worldview.83 Now we can return to the unanswered question above.
To continue with the analogy, can we remove our glasses? If so, what sort of difference
would this make? Would it result in complete blindness, a slightly blurred vision, perhaps
improved vision? That is, can we reason without a worldview and, if so, what would this be like?
There are two ways to answer this question. First, there may be a very weak sense in which one
could abstain from developing or holding to a worldview. One might somehow abstain from
answering worldview questions and thus ultimately remain agnostic. This is what some sorts of
skeptics do. They could maintain that we cannot finally settle matters of ontology, explanation,
prediction, axiology, and praxeology. In this sense they may not develop a robust, content-rich
worldview in the way that other thinkers typically do. Nevertheless they still have a method,
albeit a skeptical method, for answering the worldview questions. That is, they still have an
overriding commitment (e.g., a commitment to skepticism) which guides them in answering
worldview questions. The skeptic’s guiding principles steer them away from positively affirming
many things and thus they end up with a strange sort of worldview, perhaps an anti-worldview.
The skeptic’s anti-worldview is still a worldview of sorts, it just a worldview with very little
content. It is still a worldview in the sense that a worldview, as defined above, is a systematized
understanding or interpretation of what the world is like. According to skeptic’s anti-worldview,
the world is something which we may experience but about which we cannot truly know. From
this we may conclude, along with Vidal, that “Every one of us is in need of a worldview,
whether it is implicit or explicit”.84 There may only be one possible exception. One who lacks
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sufficient cognitive faculties may thereby refrains from developing or subscribing to a
worldview. Thus, we cannot truly reason without a worldview.
We can arrive at this conclusion in a more decisive way by considering two related theses
about the relationship between facts, interpretation, and worldviews. First, consider how Smith
and Jones, if they have different worldviews, will interpret certain facts differently. Suppose that
Smith has a roughly Judeo-Christian worldview. Jones, on the other hand, has a materialist
worldview. When they consider the readily observable fact that, say, “The cat is on the mat”,
they will understand or interpret this fact in different ways. By this I mean that they will embed
this fact within different constellations of belief. For Smith, “The cat is on the mat…and
(implicitly) is in God’s universe”. For Jones, on the other hand “The cat is on the mat…and
(implicitly) is in a materialist universe”. Thus, at the very least, we can at least accept the
relatively noncontroversial thesis that a worldview is able to suffice as a fact-interpreting
framework (i.e. worldviews influence how we interpret facts and what they ultimately mean).
This phenomenon becomes more relevant as we consider more significant facts. For instance,
consider how Smith and Jones might interpret the fact that human beings are social creatures.
Since Smith’s view of reality involves an ultimate personality (i.e., God), personhood and
sociality will likely be understood as somehow derivative of this. Jones, on the other hand, will
have to interpret and explain the existence of personhood and sociality differently. Thus,
pointing out to them the fact that human beings are social entities will mean something quite
different in both cases.
Now, consider a more controversial thesis: not only do worldviews provide this kind of
interpretive frame work, but that it is impossible to interpret any fact whatsoever outside of a
worldview. To put this in positive terms, there are no such things as “brute facts” that can be
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merely understood without interpretation. Suppose that someone who attempts to reason without
a worldview, who attempts to rid themselves all of their commitments and be a tabula rasa
willing to be written on only by brute facts that need no interpretation.85 Even though this task is
probably impossible, if someone could do this they would thereby establish a set of conditions
which would make it impossible to know or understand anything at all. Accordingly, Bahnsen
says “There are no facts or uses of reason which are available outside of the interpretive system
of basic commitments or assumptions which appeals to them.”86 Frame also says that
We have no access to reality apart from our interpretive faculties. To seek such access is
to seek release from [being human]. We cannot step outside of our own skins…We never
dig deep enough to reach some “bedrock” of pure facticity–facts undefiled by any
interpretive activity…It is better to recognize that all statements of fact are interpretations
of reality and that all true interpretations are factual.87
To use the analogy, if we remove our glasses we will be completely blind, and not merely left
with some blurry vision. There is nothing there for us to know without using employing a
worldview because there is no way for us to know except by using a worldview. Thus, we can
conclude that all of our thinking and reasoning can be considered worldview-reasoning.
IV.) Evidentialism Rejected
The implications of this discussion are far reaching. If all of this is true, then there are definite
conclusions that we can draw about the nature and scope of philosophical inquiry, epistemology
proper, and epistemology of religion. On the one hand, since neutrality is impossible, philosophy
should not be understood as dispassionate, discursive truth-finding discipline comprised of
isolated and discrete areas of inquiry. It is not clear that rational reflection by itself will
automatically yield unqualified true conclusions or even conclusions that every rational person
85
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must agree upon. Likewise, though it is helpful and good to recognize different areas of
philosophical of philosophical inquiry (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.),
philosophy nevertheless involves a cohesive network of related questions. In this way
philosophic inquiry will perhaps be best used as a tool for the development and comparison of
worldviews. By asking philosophical questions one can come to better understand, to adjust, or
perhaps even to replace their worldview if they should find that it is faulty, inconsistent, or
unable to account for important data. It will also help us identify inconsistencies and work to iron
them out, as it were. Similarly, because philosophy helps us look critically at our lenses rather
than through them, it can help us to develop a vocabulary for explaining and comparing
worldviews. As one comes to understand their own worldview in this way they will become
more articulate and able to explain their worldview to someone who differs. This can also help
us consider something of what it is like to look through someone else’s lenses and to see how,
based on their presuppositions, they arrive at the conclusions they do.
Perhaps one of the most important implications of this whole discussion has to do with
how we engage in philosophical debate. If philosophy could be conducted in a neutral way then
it would make sense to debate individual questions one at a time without any reference to other
questions. If, as has been argued, philosophy is relative to worldviews then it does not make as
much sense to employ this methodology. If Smith and Jones get into a debate over the nature of,
say, substance and fail to acknowledge the fact that they are operating with different
presuppositions and from different worldviews, then the whole debate is in jeopardy of being
undermined. Ignoring this truth does not change the fact that there is no absolute neutrality. It
only ensures that one will lack the philosophical self-consciousness that comes from
acknowledging their worldview. If one acknowledges this fact they can hope to have meaningful
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philosophical discussions. Consider Smith and Jones again. They would both do well to
acknowledge the basic presuppositions that they are building their systems upon. If they do this
can they hope to have meaningful philosophical dialogue despite their different starting points.
Likewise they can begin to understand each other’s systems in a well informed manner that lends
it the maximum amount of charity. This way they can also make sense of the fact that, though
both of them are seemingly reasonable people, they nevertheless disagree on so many things,
understand the world differently, find different arguments convincing, and so on.
This last point has particular relevance when it comes to contemporary epistemology of
religion and the debate over Enlightenment evidentialism. By appealing to these observations,
the Presuppositionalist can reject Enlightenment evidentialism as irrelevant and misleading. The
notion of evidence as something that is purely objective and which lends itself to one and only
one neatly identifiable interpretation is somewhat mistaken. As we saw above, facts and
evidence need interpretation and are thus meaningfully situated within and understood in terms
of worldviews. Thus the Enlightenment assertion that religious belief can only be justified if it is
proportioned to the evidence, while intuitively appealing, can be misleading and very easily
misapplied. This evidentialist notion appears to be built upon the faulty assumption that there is
sufficient philosophical neutrality to develop universal, uncontextualized criteria for gathering,
weighing, and interpreting evidence for religious belief. The problem, however, is that just as
each worldview comes complete with its own truth criterion so each religion has (or at least can
have) its own truth criteria and epistemology.88 Thus, when an Enlightenment evidentialist
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requires evidence in order to justify a religious belief, they will almost assuredly be committing a
sort of informal fallacy. That is, they will be making illegitimate and uninformed demands unless
they pay very careful attention to the specific truth criteria of the religion in question and only
require evidence and argumentation that is consistent with these internal criteria. This is because
the only “evidence” that can ever suffice for a worldview/religion is that which is consistent with
whatever truth criterion that the worldview/religion presupposes. Recall the observation from
above that if one sets out to argue for their ultimate truth criteria by appealing to some other
criteria then they are necessarily confused about what it means to hold to an ultimate truth
criteria. This is the same sort of problem that comes when we impose foreign, external truth
criteria to a belief system.
The point here is that justification is not a neutral topic. To lay down one theory of
justification that all religions must adhere to, be it evidentialism or whatever, is to fail to
understand that religions and worldviews already appeal to and our built upon their own internal
epistemic criteria. The result of this is that rather than offering one universal criteria, each
religion must instead be allowed to stand on the basis of its own criteria. Just as ultimate truth
criteria can only be argued for in a circular manner, so a worldview or religion can only be
argued for in a way that is consistent with its own presuppositions. It is problematic, then, to
evaluate a worldview by any criteria other than the ones it was founded on. If Smith’s religion is
unjustified according to Jones’s evidentialist criteria then this does not tell us anything about
Smith’s religion, per se, except that Jones disagrees with it based on his own presuppositions. In
such a scenario we can learn more about Jones and his commitments then about Smith’s
worldview which he is interacting with (rather, failing to interact with). The only way for Jones
to accurately and adequately assess Smith’s religion is in accord with its own presuppositions.
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Accordingly, Cornelius Van Til concludes that a believer in one system must, for the sake of
argument, step inside their interlocutor’s system and be aware of their presuppositions and vice
versa. If they do this they can hope to have a meaningful, insightful dialogue despite their
different starting points. In this way they can begin to understand each others’ systems in a
reliable way that lends a maximum amount of charity to the systems in question. Thus, what we
had earlier concluded about philosophical debate in general applies to epistemology of religion
in the same way: awareness of worldviews helps us make sense of the fact that reasonable people
may disagree on many things, understand the world differently, find different arguments
convincing, and so on.
Thus the Presuppositionalist rejects Enlightenment evidentialism in a highly nuanced way
when compared to the first three responses we considered (i.e., Natural Theology,
Wittgensteinian Fideism, and Reformed Epistemology). We treated these three responses as a
straightforward rejection of either premise (1), that belief in God is the sort of belief that requires
evidence, or as a rejection of premise (2), that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God.
The Presuppositionalist rejection, however, cannot be neatly categorized in this way. This
position has important things to say about both premises but does not build its position around a
straightforward rejection of either of them. To clarify this point it will be helpful to see how the
Presuppositionalist is sympathetic to the first three responses we considered.
While the Presuppositionalist would disagree with the Natural Theologian in terms of
methodology, there are nevertheless some important areas where they are sympathetic that are
worth pointing out. Above we established that the Natural Theologian and Enlightenment
evidentialist agree in terms of methodology. That they, they agree that in order for belief in God
to be considered rational or justified that it must be backed up with sufficient propositional
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evidence. We have just seen how the Presuppositionalist rejects this Enlightenment position
because there is no neutrality when it comes to evaluating evidence and also because each
worldview comes complete with its own justificational and epistemic criteria. In taking this
stance, however, the presuppositionalist has not said anything about what the evidence and data
point towards. In a strange sense the Presuppositionalist, being a Christian, will agree with the
Natural Theologian that there is sufficient evidence for believing in God. While they do not
advocate that this is the source of justification for belief in God, they nevertheless agree with the
Natural Theologian that the correct assessment and interpretation of all the evidence will of
course point to belief in God as being reasonable. The Presuppositionalist can thus stand in an
intermediate position and give a reason for why the Natural Theologian and the Enlightenment
evidentialist disagree. They disagree over what the evidence itself means and why it is or is not
convincing because there are different worldviews at play. Every discrete piece of evidence and
every argument will be handled differently and situated within a different wider constellation of
beliefs.
Again, the Presuppositionalist denies that there is neutrality when it comes to the
gathering, definition, and interpretation of evidence and data. However, they do not go so far as
to say that worldviews are never grounded in data or experience. There may be some conceivable
worldview or religious systems that are fideistic or for some internal reasons do not care about
grounding their beliefs in experience, but this is not contradict the point. Some worldviews,
probably most worldviews, do make use of evidence in some capacity or other. They may or may
not choose to argue for what they believe based on evidence. However, since worldviews are
interpretive systems or frameworks they will most often provide their user with a set of criteria
for understanding and interpreting the world around them. That is, worldviews typically purport
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to have some explanatory force; they typically allow their user engage all sorts of information
and make sense of our common experiences in the world. Worldviews are, after all, interpretive
lenses that we use to make sense of our lives. Thus the way that evidence relates to worldview is
not as the Enlightenment evidentialists and Natural Theologians suggest. Evidence, as has been
explained, is something that subject to worldviews. Thus evidential claims cannot be used in the
straightforward Evidentialist sense for inter-worldview debates. Rather, interpretations of
evidence may be used if one wished to demonstrate that their worldview has explanatory force or
makes sense of our experience. Thus, by giving evidences for the truth of one’s worldview, one
is not able to set it up as true and other as false. Rather, one is merely able to suggest that there is
viable. Only if it were possible to show that a worldview were not viable, perhaps that it has
some radical inconsistencies, could it then be rejected. Even this, however, is not on the bases of
discrete evidence in and of itself but instead on the basis of an internal problem.
There is a thesis behind all of this that it is important to bring forward. In bringing this
thesis to light we shall compare the Presuppositional response to evidentialism with
Wittgensteinian Fideism. As we mentioned above Wittgensteinian Fideism was formed as a
denial of premise (1), that belief in God requires evidence if it is to justifiably believed. We also
saw that this position was built upon both an autonomy thesis and a certain version of an
incommensurability thesis. At this point the similarities between the Presuppositionalists and
Wittgensteinian Fideists are apparent but the ways in which they differ need to be highlighted.
First, they are similar in that both recognize that belief systems have their own internal methods
of justification. One way they differ, however, is in their understanding of incommensurability.89
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Both, I would say, hold to some version of incommensurability, but the Wittgensteinian Fideists
have a much more stringent position than the Presuppositionalists.
For the Wittgensteinian Fideists the incommensurability thesis primarily involves their
criteria of meaning. As we saw above, meaning for them was relative to language games and
religious belief systems gives rise to language games that are logically isolated from
metaphysical, scientific, and historical language games. On this basis they understand religious
language to be expressive of a form of life rather than descriptive of reality. As we mentioned in
passing, this sort of view is not acceptable to religious conservatives because they maintain that
their religious and theological utterances are aimed at describing reality in exactly the same way
that the scientist’s or metaphysician’s language is understood to be aimed at describing reality.
The Presuppositionalist number among these sorts of religious realists who maintain that their
language is meant to describe reality in just the same way as these other sorts of language is.
Thus

the

presuppositionalist

denies

the

Wittgensteinian

Fideists’

version

of

the

incommensurability thesis. In their denial of this, however, they still maintain a softer sort of
incommensurability.
The Presuppositionalist denies that religious language is logically isolated and cut off
from other areas of inquiry. Nevertheless they do maintain that there is some incommensurability
on some levels. Rather than religious language being incommensurable with scientific, historical,
and metaphysical language, they maintain that there is some incommensurability between
worldview themselves. However, there is not a complete and rigid incommensurability whereby
people with different worldviews are completely isolated from each other. Rather, there is
enough in common for there to be effective communication between people with different
worldviews. Consider, for example, what happens when people from different religions first
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meet. Provided that they speak the same language they can communicate effectively on whole
range of topics. The incommensurability of their worldviews only really begins to shows itself
when their conversation turns to more detailed philosophical or worldview-related questions. At
this point they will begin to disagree over a number of topics, provided that they actually know
and believe enough of the view that they profess.
This sort of incommensurability thesis further explains the ways in which the
Presuppositionalist both agrees and disagrees with the Natural Theologian. According to this sort
of an incommensurability thesis, what is incommensurable is not different language games per se
but rather worldviews as whole units. They are incommensurable in that they are not directly
comparable in terms of evidence. As we saw above, it is impossible, by mere appeals to
evidence, to say that one worldview is superior to another. Again, this is because each viable
worldview will be able to make sense of the same data and interpret it differently. Or based on
internal reasons, it may not have a need to deal with the issue at all. Thus, we cannot appeal
directly to evidence in order to show that one worldview is better than another. The closest we
could come to this is to point out that a given worldview fails to give an account for something
that it attempts to give an account for. This, however, would not be an example of
commensurability per se but rather an example of what presuppositionalists call an internal
critique.90
Despite this sort of incommensurability I am not suggesting that worldviews are in no
way comparable. As mentioned studying philosophy can help one elucidate and make explicit
their worldview. Likewise, by engaging in philosophical discussion we can compare worldviews
and see how and why they provide different answers to the fundamental worldview questions
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outlined above. This is quite different from the Wittgensteinian Fidesits who seem be suggesting
a much more radical incommensurability and incomparably of different worldviews. They paint
religion as an isolated and closed circle. On my view, however, worldviews and religious are
comparable and communication between them and about them is possible even if they are, in the
end, incommensurable in terms of mere evidence.91
Lastly, we can identify some ways in which the presuppositionalist is very sympathetic to
the Reformed Epistemologist. As is clear by now, these schools reject enlightenment
evidentialism for slightly different reasons. The Reformed Epistemologist does so by offering
differing criteria for proper basicality. The Presuppositionalist, however, argues on the basis of
worldviews. Nevertheless, they stand in full agreement with the Reformed Epistemologist when
they say that belief in God does not necessarily require propositional evidence. The reason that
the Presuppositionalists believe this, however, is usually tied more directly and explicitly to their
theology.92 Since the Presuppositionalists argue that criteria for justifying beliefs are internal to
worldviews, they look directly to the Bible for the criteria and justification for belief in God.
While we cannot investigate their theological arguments and exegesis of Scripture, the
Presuppositionalists arrive at a conclusion almost identical to that of the Reformed
Epistemologists: belief in God properly basic. In fact, they go so far as to say that every human
being, by virtue of their construction and design as God’s image bearers, inescapably has
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immediate knowledge of God which they either acknowledge or suppress. On this basis, one is
fully justified to believe in God without argumentation. In fact, some Presuppositionalists would
say that because we are designed to know God immediately, that demanding proof for his
existence is imprudent.
Notice here that the Presuppositionalist has the freedom to turn directly to internal
reasons for defending the reasonableness of belief in God. The Reformed Epistemologist does
not quite have this luxury. Instead, they are committed, for better or worse, to defending the idea
that belief in God is properly basic without recourse to theological evidence. Thus, things like
God’s nature or character cannot be used to discuss the reasonableness of believing in him as
properly basic. Nor can they appeal to the theological character of human beings. The
presuppositionalist would be unwilling, because of their theological commitments, to argue in
such a way. Thus, the Reformed Epistemologist has a seemingly daunting task of defending he
basicality of belief in God without specifically challenging the presuppositions that others are
brining to the discussion. They allow their interlocutors to continue using their own
presuppositions and do not ask them to recognize and suspend judgment for the sake of
argument. The Presuppositionalist then agrees with the conclusion that the Reformed
Epistemologist arrives at while simultaneously disagreeing the exact method used to arrive that
this conclusion.
Tentative Conclusions
From all of this we can draw several tentative conclusions regarding epistemology of religion
and the justification of religious belief. First, and more generally, we can conclude that a large
part of epistemology of religion should be conducted on the worldview-level or on the
presuppositional level. That is, when we engage in epistemology of religion we must keep in
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mind that presuppositions play a crucial role and they should not be ignored. Thus we should not
carelessly assert some normative, universal criteria for measuring the justification of belief and
assume that they will apply in all circumstances and to all belief systems. This is sort of project
will most surely fail to take into account the fact that each worldview operates with its own
epistemological criteria and theories of justification. Such an approach may thus end up labeling
some beliefs as irrational or unjustified without taking into consideration the actual reasons that
one might believe them. Rather than carrying on this like, an epistemologist of religion should
always be careful to identify presuppositions and worldview-commitments; fist their own and
then others’. For this reason, whenever an individual religious belief is being considered, its
justification must ultimately be understood as relative to the belief system of the believer.
A second conclusion that we can draw from this discussion regards Enlightenment
evidentialism. Since this view fails to recognize these sorts of concerns, we can conclude that its
rejection of belief in God is misguided and thus has no teeth, as the saying goes. That is, while
the evidentialist thinks that there is insufficient evidence for belief in God, they fail to engage
with theists on a presuppositional level. Thus, while some theists, Presuppositionalists for
example, have internal reasons for believing in God without propositional evidence, this
methodology is presumed to be faulty by the Enlightenment evidentialist before any debate can
occur. In this way they impose their own criteria for justification on other systems in a way that
wrongly falsify them. To put this all into general terms, worldviews should not be dismissed or
dispelled without concern for their content, internal justification, and epistemic criteria. It seems
as one of the only ways that we can legitimately reject a worldview is if it somehow fails to meet
its own standards or is otherwise self-referentially incoherent.
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Objections and Responses
Coherentism
Before closing there are some potential problems and objections that should to be addressed. The
first and perhaps most pressing objection is that presuppositionalism as I have outlined is just
another form of Coherentism. Coherentism is a theory of justification that can be understood as a
solution to what has been referred to as the “epistemic regress problem”. Briefly, this problem
starts with recognition of the fact that the justification of a given belief often depends upon the
justification of other beliefs. That is, when justifying our beliefs we very often refer to other
beliefs in the course of justifying the one in question. If we carry on like this we will discover a
sort of justificatory chain whereby one belief is justified by another and that by another and so on
and so forth. The problem that this raises is how does justification come about in the final
analysis? Where and how might such a chain end if we where to keep following it? There are
several potential answers. It could be that the chain extends infinitely, that it ends that some
point, or that it is circular and loops back over itself. The first solution is dismissed as unhelpful
for obvious reasons. The second solution is roughly “foundationalism” as we outlined above.
The third potential solution is, roughly, “coherentism”.
Coherentism, then, is a theory of justification that depends upon epistemic circularity.
One of the problems that coherentists face is that if mere coherence is sufficient for justification
then it seems possible to arrive at multiple coherent systems that represent the world quite
differently. Presuppositionalists face the same problem. In fact, the theory of worldviews outline
above seems suspiciously similar to coherentism. On this basis one might object that all I have
offered is a different version of coherentism. This objection, however, misses the mark. As
mentioned earlier, the presuppositionalist is not offering a strictly epistemological rejection of
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enlightenment evidentialism, but rather bringing up some relevant metaphilosophical concerns.93
Thus, calling Presuppositionalism a form of coherentism is something of a category error.
I have been arguing that we do in fact make use of worldviews and that this is relevant
for rejecting Enlightenment evidentialism. I have not been arguing for the epistemic thesis that
justification is always and only a matter of coherence. Rather, as mentioned above, each
worldview has its own criteria for justification. To be sure, some worldviews may incorporate a
coherentist epistemology. Others, however, may incorporate some form of foundationalism (this
is exactly what the Reformed Epistemologist sets out to do for Christianity), or any other theory
of knowledge. Coherence certainly plays a role in the theory of as worldviews outlined above,
but it does not play the same role that it does for the coherentist: being a universal source of
justification. Rather, what it means for a worldview to be coherent is, partly, that its conclusions
and constitutive beliefs cohere with whatever epistemology and truth criteria it incorporates.
Thus, while I certainly make much of coherence, I would not argue along with a coherentist that
coherence alone is sufficient for justification. Instead, I would assert that an incoherent
worldview is problematic and that it needs either to be reworked or rejected. Thus I see
coherence as necessary for the viability of a worldview but not as the only necessary and
sufficient condition for justification. Again, justification is a condition of whatever theory of
knowledge a given worldview incorporates.
Circularity
A second objection is the charge that the Presuppositionalist is advocating for a kind of
circularity and thus their position should be dismissed. The Presuppositionalist certainly does
advocate for some kind of circularity but it is not clear that their position should be dismissed as
a result. To illustrate the kind of circularity that the Presuppositionalist admits consider their
93
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method for justifying belief in God. If asked why they believe in God, or why it is rational for
them to believe in God, the Presuppositionalist will only offer evidence and reasons deemed
appropriate by scripture. They will thus employ a biblical epistemology when arguing for the
existence of God. However, at this very point they are engaging in a kind of circular reasoning.
However, this is not a vicious circle (e.g., “The Bible is true; therefore the bible is true”), but
rather a kind of broad circularity.94 It is not a fallacious circle but a kind of circularity that seems
to be unavoidable.
Pointing out this sort of circularity does not constitute a good reason for rejecting
everything that the Presuppositionalist has to say. To be sure, one will most likely not be
convinced on the basis of such a narrow argument that they should believe in God. Nevertheless,
what the Presuppositionalist is doing when they argue in this way is demonstrative of how all
presuppositions and worldviews must be argued for. No presupposition and no worldview can be
argued for in a non-circular way. As outlined above, to argue for such a belief or commitment by
any other criteria would simply betray a commitment to these other criteria. Thus the
Presuppositionalist allows for this kind of circular reasoning because they take it be ultimately
unavoidable. To allow for this kind of circularity, however, is not to condone the use of
fallacious question begging tactics. Rather, this position simply recognizes that for human beings
all of our reasoning must be circular because we employ worldviews that either explicitly or
implicitly guide our thinking and interpretation of the world around us.
Fideism
Another objection that could be made is that this position is ultimately fideistic. However, this
claim is certainly a misunderstanding. There are two ways of defining fideism and it is easy to
demonstrate that a Presuppositionalist is not advocating either one. First, fideism could mean
94
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believing without positive reasons for believing. This is not what the Presuppositionalist is
advocating. It is true that some conceivable worldviews might perhaps operate on such fideistic
terms and the Presuppositionalist would have to allow them to do so. However, even with such a
worldview we would expect some internal reasons for why they operate in such a way.
Furthermore, simply denying the evidentialist claim that belief in God requires evidence does not
suffice for this kind of fideism. As we saw, the Presuppositionalist denies this proposition not
because evidence is in itself undesirable but rather because such a requirement is easily
misleading and apparently involves the mistaken assumption that there is sufficient neutrality
when it comes to gathering, weighing, and interpreting evidence. Thus the Presuppositionalist is
not fideistic in these terms. Likewise, as mentioned in the section on circularity, the
Presuppositionalist would give evidence and reasons for their belief provided that they are
understood and interpreted according to biblical presuppositions. Rather than being fideistic in
this way, the Presuppositionalist simply wants to leave room for people within different
worldviews to define on their own terms what counts as evidence and what counts as good
reason for believing a given thing.
A second sort of fideism, which is much more radical, is the notion that one may believe
something despite counter evidence. Again, this is not what the Presuppositionalist is setting out
to defend. It may seem that the Presuppositionalists take this position, or at least allow for this
position, because they can allow for different and contrary interpretations of the same data set by
people with different worldviews. However, this is different from saying that one believes
something in spite of evidence to the contrary. The issue that is at play here is what exactly
would suffice as counter evidence. If two people with different worldviews disagree about how
to interpret a set of data (e.g. the Enlightenment evidentialist and the Natural Theologian), this is
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not to say that one of them must necessarily entertain their beliefs in spite of counter evidence. A
trans-worldview disagreement of data interpretation does not suffice as counter evidence in the
relevant, fideistic sense. Rather, what would suffice as counter evidence for a worldview is when
it can be demonstrated that the worldview fails to account for something that it is expected to or
attempts to give an account for. Thus the Presuppositionalist is not advocating a brand of fideism
whereby religious believers may entertain unjustified contradictions.
Normative Epistemic Truth Claims
A fourth problem for the Presuppositionalist has to do with making normative epistemic claims.
One of the conclusions that we drew earlier was that worldviews should not be dismissed out of
hand and without concern for their content, internal justification, and epistemic criteria. This
constitutes something of a normative epistemic or methodological claim. The potential problem
here is that if epistemology is something that is relative to worldviews, then how is it possible to
make such normative claims? Furthermore, is it possible to conceive of some worldview which
uses internal reasons to legitimize critiquing other worldviews in a way that disregards these
normative standards? At this point, unfortunately, I am unable to formulate a satisfactory or very
well thought out response. However, I can suggest two potential lines of defense. First, one could
move in the direction of an ad hominem attack and suggest that someone who will ignore this
normative methodological claim will only prove to be closed-minded. That is, if someone argues
on the basis of their own worldview that another’s worldview is false or problematic, they are
not saying anything richly informative or meaningful. Rather they are something like a child
stopping their ears and screaming until they get their way.
Another potential line of defense could be to reference some sort of common ground in a
way that does not contradict or undercut the myth of neutrality. By common ground I mean some
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area of inquiry in which adherents of different worldviews can, for the most part, successfully
interact. The idea of there being no absolute neutrality (i.e., the myth of neutrality) does not
necessarily conflict with the idea of their being some sorts limited of common ground. For
instance, it is possible for people who have different worldviews, upon sufficient reflection, to
recognize the existence of different worldviews. This awareness of different worldviews is
significant and perhaps constitutes a sort of common ground. If there is this sort of common
ground then perhaps it is possible to make the sort of normative claim we are interested in: that it
is methodologically unsound to dismiss a worldview without recourse to its internal content and
structure. However, both of these lines of defense will need to be further worked out in another
paper.
Subjectivism or Skepticism
One last potential problem for this position is the charge it ultimately sets up some sort of
subjectivism or skepticism. That is, if worldviews rely only upon internal reasons for the
justification of belief, then what is to prevent any number of conceivable worldviews from being
valid or viable? Furthermore, and more pressing, how can anyone know in the final analysis
whether or not their worldview is in fact the correct one to hold? Internal reasons cannot confirm
that the worldview actually maps onto or corresponds to reality. After all, every viable
worldview will purport to explain reality and thus will see itself as truly descriptive of the way
that things are. Thus there is a need for something external to worldviews to ground them if there
is be certainty that one’s worldview is the correct one. However, if it is true that there is no such
thing as absolute neutrality then seems as though it impossible to arrive at such a conclusion. In
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the final analysis the Presuppositionalist has theological reasons to not worry so much about this
threat of subjectivism or skepticism.95
Nevertheless, some Presuppositional thinkers have been working on developing a
transcendental argument which aimed at demonstrating that their position is true (i.e., does
accurately capture reality). By a transcendental argument is meant a kind of argument which
aims at establishing some premise as logically primitive. By logically primate I mean something
that is argued from and not to. For instance, the law of non-contradiction is held onto in what
might be classified as a transcendental way. It is logically primitive and must argued from and
not to. That is, this law is presupposed in our reasoning. One cannot even begin argue against it
without presupposing it. Thus, it is an underlying condition that makes argumentation possible.
In an analogous way some Presuppositionalists, lead by Cornelius Van Til, have worked on
establishing a transcendental argument for God. If they succeed they would in effect be showing
that the existence of the God of the bible is, like the law of non-contradiction, an underlying
condition that makes true and false predication possible.96 However, this argument, in its current
stage of development, needs a lot of work and is far from satisfactory.
Closing Remarks
In this paper we have undertaken to outline the main contours of the contemporary epistemology
of religion. We have understood this as a debate over whether or not evidentialism applies to the
belief component of religion or not. First we considered Enlightenment evidentialism and its
rejection of belief in God. Next we surveyed several mainstream responses including Natural
95
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Theology, Wittgensteinian Fideism, and Reformed Epistemology. Lastly, we turned to a more
obscure response that is loosely grounded in the Presuppositional school of Christian
apologetics. We saw, according to this theory, that philosophy, epistemology, and epistemology
of religion are all influenced by the fact that we reason on the basis of presuppositions and
according to a worldview. While there are some areas in which this view, as presented here,
needs to be strengthened, it nevertheless suffices as a rejection of Enlightenment evidentialism.
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